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1 INTRODUCTION 
Although the  question   of  the 
formation  of a government has 
generated a lot of interest amongst 
constitutional and political scholars 
elsewhere,1 in  Lesotho  it has  never  
really  been  much  of  a  constitutional  
controversy, at  least  practically,  since  
independence. The  main  reason  has  
been  that  due  to  the constituency 
based electoral system which the 
country has been using since 
independence,2  only one  political party 
has  always been  able  to  garner  a 
sufficient majority  to  form  the 
government,3 and the leader thereof 
                                                 
1 See Boston J “Dynamics of government 
formation” in Miller R (ed) New Zealand 
government and politics, 5th ed (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press 2010). 
2 Matlosa K “The 2007 general election in 
Lesotho: managing the post-election conflict” 
(2008) 7(1) Journal of African Elections 20. 
3  Constituency based electoral models, due to 
their inherent winner-takes-all feature, have a 
tendency to produce dominant party systems. 
See Currie I & De Waal J The new constitutional 
and administrative law (Cape Town: Juta 2001) 
at 133.  
 
LAW 




 DEMOCRACY  
& DEVELOPMENT 
VOLUME 20 (2016) 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ldd.v20i1.9   
ISSN:  2077-4907 
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT/ VOL 20 (2016) 
  
Page | 175  
 
would easily be invited to form government without any controversy.  The  
conventional principle  governing formation  of  government has  always been  
straightforward – that  the  King  would invite  the  leader of  the  political party or 
coalition of parties  that  appears  to  command  the  majority in the   National  Assembly  
to  form  the government.4 Most of the time, the matter would have been easily decided 
by the election.5 The introduction of the mixed electoral system with a strong 
proportionality element6 did not only bring about a paradigm shift from a dominant 
party system to inclusive politics, but also a new phenomenon of inconclusive elections 
which produce hung parliaments. This consequently came with some uncertainties 
about the process of formation of government. The  mixed  electoral system was first 
used in Lesotho in the remedial election of 2002,7 but since the  Lesotho Congress  for  
Democracy (LCD) garnered a sufficient majority to  continue with   government,8 the  
process was  still  not  much  of  a controversy. The same  applied  to  the  2007 election  
when  the  country  used  the mixed model  for the  second  time. Matters  came  to  a  
head  in  2012  when  the  system was  used  for the  third  time. The continuity of the 
LCD in power was broken by the indecisive electoral outcome. Parties  were  then  
forced  into  negotiating   political  coalitions to enable  them  to collect  sufficient 
numbers  to  form  a government.9 For the first time since independence, the 
conventional principles on formation of a government were put to real test. Section  87 
of  the  Constitution of  Lesotho  which  embodies  the  convention  on  the  formation  of  
government was  less  helpful.  The situation of hung parliament recurred in the 2015 
snap election. With  the prospect  of  a hung  parliament being the recurrent feature of 
politics in Lesotho due  to  the  mixed  electoral system,10  the  purpose  of this  article  is  
to  extrapolate  the  constitutional conventions governing  the  formation of  government 
in  general,  and  during  hung parliament in  particular.  The  article also makes  
recommendations  for  reform  on  how  the  operation  of  these constitutional 
conventions could be strengthened in order  to   attain  the full  objects of constitutional 
democracy, and to avoid uncertainty and potential unrest. The analysis is  based largely 
on  British constitutional conventions relating to the formation  of  a government and  
how  they  have  been  reduced  to writing  in  the  Constitution of  Lesotho. 
 
                                                 
4  The trend of a dominant party system was only broken by the introduction of the mixed system in the 
2002 general election. 
5 See s 87(2) of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
6  See the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution Act No 4 of 2001. 
7  The 2002 election is said to be remedial because it was following the disputed 1998 election. See 
Matlosa K “Conflict and conflict management: Lesotho’s political crisis after the 1998 election” (1999) 
5(1) Lesotho Social Science Review 163.  
8 LCD got 79 constituency seats out of a 120 member House. 
9 See the “Coalition Agreement between ABC, LCD and BNP” (2012). 
10 Countries that use the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral system invariably find themselves 
stuck with coalition politics. See Boston J “Government formation in New Zealand under MMP: theory and 
practice” (2011) 63 (1) Political Science 79.   
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2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING THE FORMATION OF A 
GOVERNMENT IN LESOTHO 
The  process  of  government formation  in  Lesotho  is  not an  abstract  political  
process detached from the general principles undergirding constitutional  design  in the 
country. It is, like all the precepts of this design, based on the three major linchpins of 
constitutional theory in Lesotho. As a largely British based constitutional prototype, the 
Constitution of Lesotho is democratic, parliamentary and monarchical.11  This  trilogy 
does  not  only underpin the formation  of  a government in  Lesotho but   is  also  the 
basis  of  its  operation.  On the first principle of democracy, section 1(1) of the 
Constitution establishes Lesotho as a “sovereign democratic state”. Section 2  further  
provides  that  the  Constitution  is  the  supreme  law  of  the  land.  So  the  confluence  
of  these  two  sections,  read  together,   establishes the  Kingdom  as  not only a 
democracy but a constitutional one. In  accordance  with  the  democracy principle,  
section 20  of  the  Constitution gives every  citizen  of  Lesotho  right  to  take part  in 
the  conduct  of  public affairs,  directly  or  through  freely  chosen  representatives  and 
to  vote  or  stand  for  election. The section establishes both representative12 and direct 
democracy.  So the formation  of  government follows  the  democracy  principle which  
is realized  through the  medium  of  parliament.13 As Jennings, writing about the British 
constitution, poignantly contends: “according to  the  pretty  schematization  of the  
textbooks,  the  member  of  parliament  represents  a  majority  of  the  electors; 
government is  responsible  to  a  majority  of  the  House  of  Commons;  and  the  
government  thus  represents  a  majority  of  the  electors.”14   
So there is a triangular relationship between the elector, the parliament and the 
resultant government. The  principle  applies  with  equal measure  to  the  workings  of 
the  Constitution  of  Lesotho. Government  in  Lesotho  is  finally  based  on  the  broader 
will  of  the electorate  expressed  through the  doctrine  of  representation  in  
parliament. So, in essence no government in Lesotho can legally form if it offends this 
fundamental theoretical postulation. 
The  second  rudimental  aspect  of  constitutional  theory  in  Lesotho  is  that  
government  is  parliamentary. While  it  is  not  the  enterprise  of parliament  to  
govern,  as  that  is  the  province  of  the  Prime  Minister  and  Cabinet,15  the  
Parliament  in  Lesotho provides  the  parental nexus to the  executive. Under the 
Constitution, both the executive and legislature overlap in a manner somewhat inimical 
to separation of powers as practised in pure presidential systems. Members  of  the  
                                                 
11 Jennings I Cabinet Government (Cambridge: University Press 1969) 13.  
12  For clarity on the virtues of the doctrine of representation see  the decision of the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa in Matatiele Municipality and Others v The President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others 2006 (5) BCLR 622(CC). 
13  To that extent, the Constitution of Lesotho can be said to be compliant with the continental and 
regional standards on democracy. See the African Charter on Democracy Elections and Governance 
adopted by the African Union on 30 January 2007. 
14 Jennings (1969) 17. 
15 See Phillips OH & P Jackson. Constitutional and administrative law 7th Ed (London: Sweet and Maxwell 
1987). 
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executive,  both  the  Prime Minister  and  the  entire  Cabinet,  are  drawn  from  either  
of  the  two  chambers  of  Parliament16 and remain as such.17   Each member of the 
executive is both a law maker and government minister. Therefore there is a fusion of 
both.  In that way, Parliament is the linchpin of Lesotho’s Constitution.  As Grant opines 
about the British Parliament, “it is the principal democratic heart of the political 
system”.18 So in terms of the Constitution, no government can form in Lesotho without 
Parliament. Parliament gives both life and parentage to government in Lesotho.  
The third principle  which  is  equally  important in  the  trilogy  is  that  despite  
it  being exalted  as democratic,  the  constitutional  system  in Lesotho  is  also  
monarchical. This doctrine of constitutional monarchism does not only subject the 
monarch to the postulates of the Constitution,19 but also retains the monarch as the 
centripetal institution of the design. Even during the process of the formation of a 
government, the monarch is still very key. The  monarch  in  Lesotho  is  not  only  the  
indivisible head  of  the  three  branches of  government –the executive,20 the 
legislature21 and  the judicature22 – but  is  also  the  one  who  appoints  the 
government. This  is  one  area  of  the Lesotho  Constitution  where  traditional  
conceptions of  government neatly coincide with  the  received conceptions  of  
constitutional  monarchy.23 By British convention, it is the prerogative of the sovereign 
to appoint the government.24 
3 THE CHOICE OF A PRIME MINISTER AND FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT 
The choice of Prime Minister in Lesotho is based on British convention25 which has 
since been legislated under section 87(2) of the Constitution of Lesotho. Upon the 
drafting of the independence constitution, not only in Lesotho, but across the whole of 
Commonwealth Africa and the Caribbean, one of the most nagging questions has been 
the translation of British constitutional conventions – unwritten as they are in origin – 
                                                 
16 See section 87(4) of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
17 S 87(7) of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
18 Grant M The UK Parliament (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2009) 6 the author says, quoting 
Bagehot, “cabinet is a combining committee – a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative 
part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one and in its function it 
belongs to the other.” However, Grant also observes that the de facto powers of parliament are limited by 
“majority government …”. 
19 On the general principles of constitutional monarchy, see Barker E British constitutional monarchy 
(London: COI (1958). See also Bogdanor V The monarchy and the constitution (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1955). 
20 See s 86 of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
21 See s54 of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
22 See s120 of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
23  See Schapera I A handbook of Tswana law and custom (Frank Cass 1964). 
24 In terms of s 87(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993), this prerogative is subject to advice of the 
Council of State. 
25  On the nature of constitutional conventions see Jaconnelli J “The nature of constitutional convention” 
(1999) 19(1) Legal Studies 24; Munro CR “Laws and conventions distinguished” (1975) 91 Law Quarterly 
Review 218. 
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into written constitutions.26 The greatest challenge has been brought about by the 
temptation, at independence, to reduce the originally unwritten conventions into the 
written constitutions of the newly independent nations. This dilemma was underscored 
by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Adegbenro v Akintola,27 wherein Lord 
Bryce opined that the British Constitution “works by a body of understandings which no 
writer can formulate”. This notwithstanding, the independence Constitution of Lesotho 
codified the British conventions on the fundamental structure and functioning of 
government.28 The 1993 Constitution became just the mirror image of the 
independence constitution on the fundamental structures and functioning of 
government. This strong colonial content in the Constitution of Lesotho is not in 
keeping with the pattern of constitutions that emerged in Africa in the early 1990s.29 
These constitutions sought to be creative by placing primacy on liberal notions such as 
human rights, oversight institutions and separation of powers.  
Despite the difference in historical evolutions of parliament in Britain and the 
colonial parliament in Lesotho, the country has tenaciously retained the British 
structure of government. Thus, it has become important that in order to properly 
understand the provisions of the Constitution of Lesotho, the nature of the conventions 
upon which they are based must also be properly understood. However, that does not 
negate the fact that the Constitution of Lesotho is written and that the meaning of its 
clauses must be realised. Where it departs from British convention, the principle of 
constitutional supremacy dictates that the written text of the Constitution shall prevail.  
Government  in  Lesotho,  starting  with  its  formation, turns  on  the  office  of  
Prime Minister.30  However, because  of  the  general  principles extrapolated above,  the  
choice  of  the  Prime  Minister  is not   directly from  the  electorate – voters in Lesotho 
do not elect the Prime Minister, at least not directly.  It is the prerogative of the 
monarch.  This is a conventional rule inherited from British constitutional history.31 
Although the  position  of  Prime  Minster  came  to be  so  central to  the  formation  and  
functioning  of  government at  Westminster,  it  is  a  fairly modern institution traceable 
merely to the 18th  century. According to one British authority, “…it  was  brought  out 
by  the  combination  of  a  number of  factors  including  royal confidence,  pre-
                                                 
26 Ghany HA “The evolution of the power of dissolution: the ambiguity of codifying Westminster 
conventions in the Commonwealth Caribbean” (1999) 5(1) The Journal of Legislative Studies 54. 
27 1963 AC 614. See also Adegbenro v Akintola & Another (1963) 7(2) Journal of African Law 99. 
28  The inherent nature of British constitutional conventions to the constitutional design was embedded 
by the proviso to section 76(2) of Lesotho’s Independence Constitution of 1966 as follows: “Provided that, 
except in the cases specified in paragraphs (a), (f), (g), (h), (i) and (j) of this subsection (where he may 
have absolute discretion), King shall in the exercise of the said functions act, so far as may be, in 
accordance with constitutional conventions applicable to the exercise of similar functions by Her Majesty in 
the United Kingdom (emphasis added).”  
29 Fombad CM “Constitutional reform and constitutionalism in Africa: reflections on some current 
challenges and future prospects” (2011) 59 Buffalo Law Review 1007. 
30 It is interesting to note that the Constitution does not specifically provide for the functions of the Prime 
Minister.  
31 See Barker (1958). 
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eminence among ministers, patronage as  First  Lord of the Treasury, and  especially 
control  of  commons.”32  
The  position  became  firmly consolidated in  the  latter  part  of the  19th  century as  a  
direct  product of  the  ascendency of  representative democracy  and  its  corollaries like  
the  development of  the political party  system.  Thus,  being  the  successor  to  the 
office  of  the  First  Lord of  the  Treasury,  the  position  owes its origin and existence to  
the  prerogative of  the  monarch. In  Lesotho  the  position  of  Prime  Minister  is  even  
newer  having  been  introduced  only  in  1965 as  part  of  the Westminster  
constitutional conceptions transplanted  to  Lesotho in the run-up to independence. The  
Constitution of  Lesotho  has  only  codified the  British constitutional conventions on  
the  question of  the choice of  Prime  Minister as follows: “The  King  shall  appoint as  
Prime  Minister the  member  of  the  National  Assembly who  appears to  Council of  the  
State  to  be  the  leader  of  the  political  party  or  coalition of  political parties  that  will  
command the  support  of  a  majority  of  the members  of  the  National  Assembly.”33 
What  is  notable  is  that  the  section  has  slightly  changed  from  its  original  
formulation  at  independence. The  independence constitution did  not  have  the  
requirement  of  the  “advice of  the  Council  of  State” which  arguably rendered it  
closer to  the  classic British  royal  prerogative. In  fact , in  terms  of  the  independence 
constitution of Lesotho the power to  appoint  the  Prime  Minister  was  one  of  the  
many  discretionary powers  of  the  King.34 In  terms  of  constitutional parlance, these  
were  the  powers  of  the  King which  he  exercised  “in accordance  with  his own  
deliberate  judgment”.35 These  powers  hardly exist  under  the  current constitutional  
design  -  all  the  powers of  the  King  are now  subject  to  advice  either  from  Prime  
Minister,36 Council of  State37 or other government institution.38 
Be that as it may,  the  general  principle  remains  intact – the choice  of  the  
Prime  Minster  is  the  prerogative  of  the  King  not  the  Council  of  State  or  the  
National  Assembly. The  two  are  only  procedural  limitations  on  the  discretion  of  
the  King  to  appoint  the  Prime  Minster. Nevertheless,  as  a result  of the  ascendancy 
of  constitutional monarchism  and  the  development of  the party  system,  the  
convention  has  consolidated at Westminster  that governments  hold  office  by virtue 
of  their  ability  to  command  the  confidence  of  the  House.39 Section  87(2) of  the  
Constitution  of  Lesotho  is  by  and  large based  on  this  convention. The convention  
                                                 
32 Phillips & Jackson (1987) 318. 
33  See section 87(2) of the Constitution of Lesotho 1993. 
34 See Palmer V & Poulter S The Legal System of Lesotho (Virginia:The Miechie Company 1972) at p 249. 
35 Section 75 of the 1966 Constitution ((Schedule to Lesotho Independence Order No 1172 of 1966) 
provides that the King could “act in accordance with his own deliberate” in the performance of certain 
specified functions. Those were appointment of senators, dissolution of parliament, appointment of Prime 
Minister, dismissal of Prime Minister. The Constitution had the interesting proviso that “the King shall in 
the exercise of the said functions act, so far as may be, in accordance with any constitutional conventions 
to the exercise of a similar function by Her Majesty in the United Kingdom”. 
36 See for instance s 124 of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
37 See s 95 of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
38 For instance, the Judicial Service Commission. See s 132 of the Constitution of Lesotho. 
39 Jennings (1969). 
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presents  a  democratic limitation  on  the  King’s prerogative to  appoint  the  Prime  
Minister. In  terms  of this  convention, the  Prime  Minster must  at  all  material times  
command  the  confidence of  the  National  Assembly. This is the golden  rule of  a  
parliamentary democracy irrespective  of  whether  the  election  produces a  clear  
majority  for  one  party  or  a  hung  parliament.40 
The  use  of  the  words  “who  appears” in  section 87(2)  has  generated  a  lot  of  
controversy. The concept has its origins at Westminster.   What it actually means  is that  
there  is  no  vote that  is  necessary  for  the  choice  of Prime Minster. The fundamental 
principle is that the King remains the final arbiter in the continuum; however, the King’s 
judgment can no longer be absolute as it used to be in history.41 In making his  judgment 
the  King  is  guided  by  the convention that  the  person  he  appoints  should  “appear”  
to him to enjoy the  confidence of  the  House. Bogdanor captures this convention much 
more aptly, in that “the sovereign’s responsibility is confined to that of appointing as 
Prime Minister the person who is most likely to enjoy the confidence of the 
Commons”.42  This section has been a subject of judicial determination in the case of 
Ntsu Mokhehle v Molapo Qhobela and Others.43  In casu, Ntsu Mokhehle, who was the 
Prime Minister of Lesotho since 1993, and leader of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) 
since its formation in the early 1950s, had fallen out of favour with his own executive 
committee which in turn organised a party conference to remove him as party leader. At 
the time it was not clear both to him and his executive committee, what his status as 
Prime Minister would be if he were to be removed as party leader. His own view was 
that being party leader is conditio sine quo non for the office of Prime Minister.  The 
Court made a clear distinction between the two – it held that the Prime Minister is the 
creature of the National Assembly.  Members of the National Assembly are empowered 
to vote for the Prime Minister and vote him out.44 The Court held: 
It is clear from the above that in all the happenings in parliament, the BCP as a 
political unit does not feature prominently. Its members are recognised by the 
Constitution as individuals despite the use of the term political party in the 
Constitution as individuals in the Constitution... The party does not feature by law 
in the making or unmaking of the Prime Minister.45  
The  operation  of  this  principle in  Lesotho  had  been  fairly straightforward until  
2012 when  the  election  for the first time produced  no clear majority for a single party 
in  Parliament. This rule has a double-pronged rationale – first, the King has to make 
                                                 
40  Bogdanor V “A hung parliament: a political problem, not a constitutional one” in Brazier A & Kalitowski 
S (eds) No overall control? The impact of a “hung parliament” on British politics (London: Hansard Society 
2008) 19. 
41  Under the independence constitution, the King used to have powers which he could exercise in 
accordance with his own deliberate judgement. These are the powers he could exercise without being 
advised by any authority under the constitution. They were in his absolute discretion subject only to the 
constitution. See s76(2) on independence constitution of 1966. 
42  Bogdanor (2008) 20. 
43 CIV/APN/75/97. 
44 Sections 87(8) and 87(5) (a) of the Constitution of Lesotho (1993). 
45 Ntsu Mkhehle v Molapo Qhobela & Others (1997) 17-18. Emphasis added. 
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sure that the person he appoints will form a stable and effective government.46 
Secondly, it accords with the principle of democracy which in a way has diluted the 
purity and absoluteness of the classic prerogatives of the King. So the government that 
is formed must resonate with the general will of the people as represented by 
Parliament. Jennings adroitly captures the democracy principle thus: 
The extension of the franchise, the attainment of a large measure of freedom of speech, 
and the organisation of parties, have created the modern Constitution. The House of 
Commons and the Cabinet are the instruments of democracy. The prerogative of the 
Crown and, to a less degree, the powers of the aristocracy, have been subordinated to 
public opinion.47 
This postulation arguably applies with equal measure to the constitutional design in 
Lesotho. Another  limitation in the  new  design  is that  the  King’s power  of  making  a 
judgment has  shifted  to  the  Council  of  State. The Council of State is the successor to 
the erstwhile Privy Council which was the advisory body to the King under the Lesotho 
1966 Constitution. The primary purpose of the newfound Council of State is ‘to assist 
the King in the discharge of his functions’.48 Mahao contends that the exercise of 
residual powers by the King is one area where the 1993 Constitution of Lesotho is not 
identical with the Westminster design. He contends that “whatever residual prerogative 
vests in the King in Lesotho under the constitution [it] can only be exercised on the 
advice of the Council of State”.49 It therefore suggests that the King has no individual 
discretion under the 1993 Constitution.50 The major criticism against the Council of 
State is that its structure is not balanced – it favours the executive or the Prime Minister 
who is a member himself. The majority of its members are largely ex officio people who 
in one way or another are appointed by the Prime Minister in their various 
designations.51 In that sense, it can safely be argued that the introduction of the Council 
                                                 
46 Rasmussen J “Constitutional aspects of government formation in a hung parliament” (1997) 
Parliamentary Affairs 143. 
47 Jennings (1969)  14. 
48 See s 95 (1) of the 1993 Constitution. 
49 Mahao NL “The constitution and the crisis monarchy in Lesotho” (1997) 10(1) Lesotho Law Journal 165 
188. 
50  Section 91(2) of the Constitution of  Lesotho, 1993 provides: “Where the King is required by this 
Constitution to do any act in accordance with the advice of the Council of State and the Council of State is 
satisfied that the King has not done that act, the Council of State may inform the King that it is the 
intention of the Council of State to do that act after the expiration of a period to be specified by the 
Council of State, and if at the expiration of that period the King has not done that act, the Council of State 
may do that act themselves and shall, at the earliest opportunity thereafter, report the matter to 
Parliament; and any act so done by the Council of State shall be deemed to have been done by the King 
and to be his act”. 
51 Section 95(2) of the Constitution of Lesotho, 1993 provides for the composition of the Council of State 
thus: the Prime Minister; the Speaker of the National Assembly; two judges or former judges of the High 
Court or Court of Appeal who shall be appointed by the King on the advice of the Chief Justice; the 
Attorney-General; the Commander of the Defence Force; the Commissioner of Police;  a Principal Chief 
who shall be nominated by the College of Chiefs; two members of the National Assembly appointed by the 
Speaker from among the members of the opposition party or parties; not more than three persons who 
shall be appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister, by virtue of their special expertise, 
skill or experience; and a member of the legal profession in private practice who shall be nominated by 
the Law Society. 
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of State to the constitutional design of Lesotho served more to emasculate the powers of 
the King and shifted them more towards the Prime Minister.52  
 Thus,  according to  this  new  design,  it  is  the  Council  of  State  that  makes  
the  de facto judgment  on  who  should be  appointed  as  the  Prime  Minister. The  
temptation  of  pushing  this  responsibility of  making  the  judgment to  the  Speaker  of  
the  National  Assembly offends  the  spirit  of this constitutional convention. The  
current  challenge to the  constitutional design in Lesotho  is  that  the  Council of State, 
although it  came to cushion the  King from political decisions and their implications, 
would seem to have rendered the King entirely titular.   
4 A HUNG PARLIAMENT AND THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT 
FORMATION 
The centrepiece of Lesotho’s system of government as a Westminster design is that the 
government of the day must enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly.53 In 
Lesotho, members of parliament are elected at the general election for a maximum term 
of five years.  Commonly, one party has a majority of seats in the National Assembly, and 
such party forms a government smoothly in terms of section 87 (2) of the Constitution. 
However, both the 2012 and 2015 general elections produced a result in which no party 
had a majority of members in the National Assembly. This is known as a “hung 
Parliament”.54 The general principles of parliamentary democracy articulated above 
apply mutatis mutandis to the formation of a government irrespective of whether the 
parliament is “hung” or there is a clear majority for one party. As Bogdanor contends: “A 
hung parliament merely makes transparent the fundamental principle of parliamentary 
government, a principle which has often been covert since 1868: a government depends 
upon the confidence of Parliament.”55 
Section 87(2), which  enshrines  the  golden  rule  of  formation  of a government, 
anticipates that  a government  in  Lesotho  can  be  formed  by the  leader  of  the  
political  party  or  coalition  of  political  parties that will command the support of a 
majority of the members of the National Assembly. Lesotho has no established 
experience and precedent with hung parliaments largely because of the constituency 
based electoral system that tends to invariably produce a single party majority in 
                                                 
52At independence, the King used to have deliberate powers whereby he could exercise pure discretion 
without any “advice”.   Section 75 of the 1966 Constitution (Schedule to Lesotho Independence Order No 
1172 of 1966) states that the King could “act in accordance with his own deliberate judgement” in the 
performance of certain specified functions. Those were the appointment of senators, dissolution of 
Parliament, and appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister. The Constitution had the interesting 
proviso that “… the King shall in the exercise of the said functions act, so far as may be, in accordance with 
any constitutional conventions to the exercise of a similar function by Her Majesty in the United 
Kingdom”. 
53 Martin L & Stevenson R “Government formation in parliamentary democracies” (2001) 45(1) American 
Journal of Political Science 33.  
54  Maer, L Hung Parliaments. House of  Commons Library: Parliament and Constitution Centre, Standard 
Note: SN/PC/04951 (2010) 1. 
55 Bogdanor (2008) 25. 
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Parliament.56 The  2012 elections experience was  the  first, and  was  not handled with  
procedural clarity that developed  the  precedent  that  could be  recommended for the  
succeeding situations  of hung  parliament. In  2012, after  the  declaration  of  the 
results, it  became  clear that  the then Prime Minister, Pakalitha  Mosisili, through  his 
newly founded Democratic Congress (DC) only secured 40 per cent of  both  the  total 
national vote  and  of the  seats in  the National Assembly.57  Immediately, the  leaders of  
the All Basotho  Convention (ABC), LCD and Basotho National Party (BNP) hurriedly 
went  to a press conference to announce  their  intention to  form  a  coalition 
government.58 They even wrote a letter to the King informing him about their intention. 
At the same time, the DC was busy still bargaining with other parties, including the ones 
that had gone public about their intention to form government. DC even threatened to  
form  a minority  government  in  case  it did  not  succeed in  putting together  a  
majority coalition . At  that  time  the 14th  day  period  provided  for   by  the  
Constitution59  between  the  election  and  the  convening  of new  Parliament had  not 
yet lapsed. The  situation  nearly  turned  ugly as  there  were  even  media threats to  
prospective members  of  parliament should  they  vote for  one  camp and  not  the  
other. That chaotic situation was resolved by the first meeting of parliament. In  terms  
of the  Constitution,  the  first  business of  Parliament is  to  elect  the Speaker and  
Deputy  Speaker.60 Thus,  when  the  parties  went  to  the  first  sitting of  parliament, 
there  was  still a  lot  of  uncertainty on  how the alliances really stood. The provisional 
coalition of ABC, LCD and BNP had   candidates for both the positions of Speaker and 
Deputy Speaker, and the DC also had its candidates. The outcome was that the ABC 
alliance won the vote for the Speaker.61 However, the  number of votes was greater than  
the  total  number  of  the members of parliament of  three coalescing  parties,62 which 
suggested that  there was support from  the  smaller political  parties  which had  
consolidated themselves into  a  third  force styled “Bloc”.63  It  was  after  that vote  that  
the DC effectively surrendered, and  that was the  time  when  the  public  and  probably 
                                                 
56 Boston (2011) 80. 
57 See 2012 election results available at www.iec.org.ls (accessed 30 December 2014). 
58  See BBC, “Lesotho election: Tom Thabane's ABC to form coalition” 30 May 2012. Available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa  (accessed 20 January 2015). 
59 Section  82(1)(b) of The Constitution provides: “…after Parliament has been dissolved, the time 
appointed for the meeting of the National Assembly shall not be later than fourteen days after the holding 
of a general election of members of the National Assembly and the time appointed for the meeting of the 
Senate shall be such time as may be convenient after nomination of one or more senators in accordance 
with section 55 of this Constitution”. 
60 See s 63(4) of the Constitution. 
61 Lesotho News Agency (LENA) “Honourable Motanyane new Speaker of National Assembly” 6 June 2012 
available at http://www.gov.ls/articles/2012/hon_motanyane_new_speaker.php (accessed on 20 January 
2015). 
62 The total number of seats for the three parties was 61 seats out the 120. Mr. Motanyane got 71 votes, 
beating another candidate for the position, Ms. Ntlhoi Motsamai, who got 49. 
63 After the 26 May 2012 National Assembly Election, the ABC, LCD and BNP came together to form a 
government with 61 seats. The DC and Basotho Batho Democratic Party (BBDP) also came together to 
form the official opposition with 49 seats, while six parties — the Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC), 
Lesotho Workers’ Party (LWP), Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), National Independent Party (NIP), 
Basotho Democratic National Party (BDNP) and Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) officially identified 
themselves as the “Bloc” with 10 seats.  
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the Council of  State got a  sense of  who would  command  the majority  of  the  National  
Assembly.64 Tom Thabane, the leader of the ABC was therefore accordingly appointed 
and sworn in as the Prime Minister on 8 June 2012.65 
The 2015 election gave the country a second opportunity to test these 
constitutional conventions as the election produced yet another hung parliament.  
Lesotho held parliamentary elections on 28 February 2015. The Independent Electoral 
Commission took four days to announce the final seat allocation. When the final seats 
allocation was announced on Wednesday 4 March 2015, it became apparent that there 
was no single party with clear majority in the National Assembly. Political parties 
started political negotiations for a coalition government. On Wednesday 4 March 2015, 
seven political parties announced their provisional agreement to form a coalition,66 and 
to appoint the former Prime Minister, Pakalitha Mosisili, in terms of section 87(2) of the 
Constitution as the incoming Prime Minister. Of the ten political parties that managed to 
get seats in the National Assembly, only three parties – the ABC, BNP and Reformed 
Congress of Lesotho (RCL) – were not part of the coalition. 
Table 1: Seat Allocation for 10 Parties represented in Parliament  
Political Party Constituency Seats  PR Seats  Final Seats Allocation  
1. ABC 40 6 46 
2. BCP 0 1 1 
3. BNP 1 6 7 
4. DC 37 10 47 
5. LCD 2 10 12 
6. LPC 0 1 1 
7. MFP 0 1 1 
8. NIP 0 1 1 
9. PFD 0 2 2 
10. RCL 0 2 2 
TOTAL 80 40 120 
Source: Adapted from IEC results announcement after 2015 Election 
While  the  outcome  on  the  vote  for  the  Speaker  may  give  a sense  of  how  
alliances  stand,  together  with  the  publicly announced coalitions,  the  process  is  still  
uncertain  and  at  most  risky. Election of the Speaker may not necessarily be a show 
confidence by the sponsoring political party or parties in the government or Prime 
                                                 
64 The election of the Speaker became the apparent confirmation of how alliances stand in the National 
Assembly, and who would be able to command the majority of the House. 
65 It is important to note that there was never any voting by the National Assembly. There is no voting 
that is necessary for the choice of the Prime Minister in Lesotho.  
66 The seven political parties that announced a provisional coalition were the Democratic Congress (DC), 
Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), Popular Front for Democracy, National Independence Party 
(NIP), Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC) and Basotho Congress Party 
(BCP). 
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Minister. The Speaker may have his own popularity different from that of the Prime 
Minister.67 
After the 2015 election, the total number of seats for all the seven coalescing 
political parties was 65 while the total number for the three parties68 in the minority 
coalition was 55. Ordinarily, it was expected that this is the structure of the vote for the 
elections of the Speaker.   The Tables below show the structure of the votes for both the 
Speaker and the Deputy Speaker. 
Table 2: Elections of Speaker of the National Assembly  
Candidate  Sponsoring Alliance Membership Status Votes 
Mrs Ntlhoi Motsamai DC-led Alliance She is a member of 
parliament 
66 
Mr Sello Maphalla ABC-led Alliance He is a former member 
of parliament 
53 
Total   11969 
Source: Adapted from the Elections of Speaker and Deputy in Parliament on 10 March 2015 
While it was already expected that the DC alliance as the majority coalition 
would win the vote, it would seem that the alliance got an additional vote. In terms of 
the coalition agreement the seven political parties have 65 votes.  But as it appears from 
Table 1 above the coalition gained one more vote, and indeed the opposition coalition 
dropped one vote. This may mean that there is one member who just exercised his or 
her freedom as a member of parliament without any intention to defect. Another 
possibility could be that indeed the process of wooing members of parliament from one 
alliance to the other was not yet complete.  
Table 3: Election of Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly 
Candidate Sponsoring Alliance Membership Status Votes 
Mr Tseuoa Lethoba DC-alliance Not a member of 
parliament 
66 
Mr Makhetha Motsoari ABC-alliance Not a Member of 
parliament  
53 
Total   119  
Source: Adapted from the Elections of Speaker and Deputy in Parliament on 10 March 2015 
The election of the Deputy Speaker only confirms the results of the election of 
the Speaker. The DC-alliance seems to have gained one vote. It would seem that neither 
the express provisions of the Constitution nor constitutional practice can provide 
                                                 
67 In the 2012 election for the Speaker of the National Assembly, the votes far outnumbered the seats of 
the provisional coalition of ABC, LCD and BNP. 
68 The ABC, BNP and RCL. 
69 The number is 119 as opposed to 120 because one member of the RCL, Dr Motloheloa Phooko was not 
in attendance. He finally relinquished his position in Parliament. It is still unknown, however, who from 
the opposition benches consistently voted with the government alliance in both the Speaker and Deputy 
Speaker elections. 
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definite guidelines in Lesotho to the Council of State on how a government is formed in 
the case of a hung parliament. In that event, help could most appropriately be sought 
from British constitutional conventions  on  which  the  rule  on  the formation  of  a 
government  is  based. Even  when  the  election  has  not  been  conclusive as to  who  
clearly has  the  majority  of  the  members,  the  fundamental principle  that  the 
government must be  able to  command   the  confidence  of  the  National  Assembly  is 
still sacrosanct . The rationale for this principle is that in the absence of parliamentary 
confidence the resultant government lacks democratic legitimacy.70 Although  Britain  
had  its  second  hung  parliament after  the  Second  World War only in  2010,71  its  
ability  to  handle hung parliament situations is  based  on  what  are called  “caretaker 
conventions”.72 These conventions guide British constitutional practice from the 
dissolution of parliament until the formation of a new government.73 These  
conventions  are  generally accepted and  applied  in  other  Westminster designs, such  
as,  Canada, New Zealand and  Australia.74 One such convention, which is widely 
accepted, is that a caretaker government cannot resign. This is  the  convention  by  
which  parliamentary  systems  ensure  that  “the  country  is  never  left  without  a  
functioning executive”.75 In Lesotho this convention is not so well-established. In  2012, 
Prime  Minister Mosisili  resigned  before  the  first  sitting of Parliament  alleging  that it  
is  only  a  procedural formality.76 This left uncertainty in government. This was  not  
only  dangerous but  also  not  in  the  interest of  the  country as  he  did  not  advise  the  
King as to  who  should  be  invited  to  form  a government when he resigned. The  
convention is even more important during  a hung  parliament than  during  clear  
majority  situations  because  there is authority  to  the  effect that  the  incumbent Prime  
Minister has  a  right  to  remain  in  office  until  his  support  is  tested on  the  floor of  
the  House.77 This  is  because  the  theory  of  Westminster parliamentary practice  is  
that  support or  lack  thereof  for governments  is determined “inside  and  not  outside 
parliament”.78 Another corollary to  the convention  is that  the King  may  not  dismiss  a  
Prime  Minister on  the  ground that  he does  not  hold  the  confidence of parliament 
when  parliament has  not  yet  met  to test  it on  the  floor of  the  House. The 
Constitution of   Lesotho has codified and slightly modified the convention. In  terms  of 
section 87(5)(b) of the  Constitution,  the  King  advised by  the Council  of  State  is  
entitled  to  dismiss a  Prime  Minster if  after the general election, but even before the 
                                                 
70 Schleiter P & Belu V “The Challenge of Periods of Caretaker Government in the UK” (2014) 
Parliamentary Affairs 1. 
71 Maer (2010). 
72 Schleiter & Belu (2014). 
73 Schleiter & Belu (2014). 
74 See  Boston J “Dynamics of government formation”  in R, Miller (ed) New Zealand government and 
politics, 5th ed (Melbourne: Oxford University Press 2010). 
75 Boston (2010) 455. 
76
 SABC News “Lesotho Prime Minister Mosisili resigns after poll loss” Wednesday 30 May 2012 available at 
http://www.sabc.co.za/news/ (accessed 15 March 2015). 
77
 Twomey A “The Governor-General’s role in the formation of government in a hung parliament” Sydney Law 
School Research Paper No 10/85 (August 2010).   
78  Twomey (2010) 3. See also Harris MC & Crawford J “The powers and authorities vested in him – the 
discretionary authority of state governors and the power of dissolution” (1969) 3(3) Adelaide Law Review 
303. 
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first meeting of the National Assembly, it appears that as a result of the election the 
sitting Prime Minister will no longer be able to command the confidence of the House.79  
It would seem that while the classic British convention gives the sitting Prime Minister 
an incumbency advantage of remaining in office until his confidence is tested on the 
floor of the house, the Constitution of Lesotho empowers the King to dismiss the Prime 
Minister even before the first meeting of the House. However it is critical to note that 
the section is couched in permissive language.80   
In  cases  of  a clear  majority  this section  may  be  operationalised smoothly  but  
in  cases  of  a hung  parliament the King  must implement  it  with  caution. Dismissal  of  
a government  is  a  highly  partisan  act   which  ordinarily conflicts with  the  
convention that  the  King may  not  be  seen  to  be  partisan.81 While  dismissal of a 
government is  the  longstanding  prerogative of  the  King, it  has  latterly been  hugely 
affected by the ascendancy of  electoral democracy in terms which  the  power  to  
dismiss government has largely  shifted  to  the  electorate or  its  representatives.82 In 
situations of a hung parliament the King is generally encouraged to exercise restraint. 
According to  Brazier,  during  an  inconclusive election  “the  guiding  light  should  be  
political  decisions politically arrived  at”.83 There is authority to the effect that where  
the  political  process  fails  to  produce  a  way  forward, the  King’s  prerogative of  
dismissal  and  appointment  of  a Prime  Minister  may  be  necessary84. But  the  golden  
rule  is  not  to  draw  the  monarch  into  controversy  or political  negotiations.85 The  
best route,  therefore,  for the  King is  to  leave  the  determination  of  who  will  
command  the  majority in the House  to  the  political  negotiation  process. 
The  Constitution  of  Lesotho  does  not  have  the  timeline  for  the  formation  of  
a government  after  an election – only  the  time  for the  first  meeting of  Parliament is  
                                                 
79 Section 87(5) Provides: 
 “The King may, acting in accordance with the advice of the Council of State, remove the Prime 
Minister from office— 
(a) if a resolution of no confidence in the Government of Lesotho is passed by the National 
Assembly and the Prime Minister does not within three days thereafter, either resign from his 
office or advise a dissolution of Parliament; or  
(b) if at any time between the holding of a general election to the National Assembly and the date 
on which the Assembly first meets thereafter, the King considers that, in consequence of changes 
in the membership of the Assembly resulting from that election, the Prime Minister will no longer 
be the leader of the political party or coalition of political parties that will command the support 
of a majority of the members of the Assembly”. 
80 It is important to note that the section uses the word “may”, not “shall”. It therefore theoretically leaves 
some discretion to the King to make a determination. It is, however, ordinarily expected that the King may 
retain the Prime Minister who has lost the support of the majority of the members of the National 
Assembly. 
81 Brazier R “Monarchy and the personal prerogatives – a personal response to Professor Blackburn” 
(2005) Public Law 45. 
82 Rusmussen, J “Constitutional aspects of government formation in a hung parliament” (1987) 40(2) 
Parliamentary Affairs 139. 
83 Brazier R Constitutional practice: the foundations of British government, 3rd (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 1999)  37. 
84 Hazell R & A Paun A Making minority government work: hung parliaments and the challenges for 
Westminster and Whitehall  (London: Institute for Government 2009). 
85 Hazell & Paun (2009). 
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fixed.86 This process of negotiating the coalition may inordinately extend the caretaker 
period. However,  it is important to note that, according  to  convention,  caretaker  
periods  are  not  healthy as  government  is  expected  to  proceed  with the policy  
status  quo – the  policy  position that  was in place when  the  outgoing government lost  
its  parliamentary basis. This  convention  of  limiting  governments during  caretaker 
periods is  not  widely  and  universally  applied  in  all  Westminster systems.87  
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  principal  question  is  whom and how  should  the  King  
appoint under  section  87  of  the  Constitution of  Lesotho in  situations  of  an 
inconclusive election.  After the  inconclusive election in  2010,  Britain  collated  all  its  
conventions  relating  to the formation  and  management  of  government  into  what  is  
called the “Cabinet  Manual”.88 In situations  of  a hung  parliament the  Manual  
confirms  the  conventional view that  where  there  is  significant doubt  following  an  
election  over  the  government’s ability  to  command  the  confidence  of the House of  
Commons,  the  nature  of  government formed will  depend on  “discussions between  
political  parties  and  any  resulting  agreement”.89  
The  Manual  envisages  fundamentally two ways in  which  a government  may 
be  formed  out  of  the  political  bargaining  resulting  from  an  inconclusive election.90 
The first type  which  more  closely resonates with  section  87  of  the  Constitution of  
Lesotho,  is  through  a  formal  coalition  government. This is  the  arrangement by 
which parties agree to constitute a government comprising ministers from  more  than  
one  political  party,  and  they  should  conclusively command the  majority  of  the  
House  of  Commons. This type was followed in Britain after an inconclusive election in 
2010. The process resulted in the Conservative-Liberal coalition government.91 The  
process  of  negotiating coalitions becomes  a  generally open  political  process  
irrespective of  the  strength of  political parties in  terms  of  electoral outcomes. 
Similarly, this  is  the  type  that  was  followed  in  Lesotho  after  an inconclusive  
election in 2012.  The  only  difference  between  Lesotho  and  Britain  is  that  in  
Britain  the  party  with the most  votes  in  the  House  of  Commons is  the  one  which  
managed  to  put  togeher and lead  a  coalition government.  In  Lesotho  the  person  
who  was  invited  to  form  a government,  Thomas  Thabane,  was  from  a  party (ABC)  
which was  the  second  strongest in  the  National  Assembly.92  There  does not  seem  
to  be  any  established  convention  to  the  effect  that  the  party  with the most  seats  
in  the  House of Commons or National  Assembly, as the case may be,   has  the  first 
opportunity  to  form  a government.   What  seems  to  be  the  corollary  of  confidence 
                                                 
86 See s 82(1((b) of the Constitution of Lesotho 1993. 
87 Schleiter & Belu (2014). 
88 United Kingdom Cabinet The Cabinet Manual: a guide to laws, conventions and rules on the operation of 
government (2011). 
89  The Cabinet Manual (2011)  14. 
90 The Cabinet Manual (2011) 14. 
91 See the Conservative-Liberal Coalition Agreement styled “The Coalition: our programme for 
government”  (2010) available at www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/coalition-documents (accessed 25 
April 2015). 
92 See Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) “Lesotho National Assembly Elections 26th May 2012” The 
party with most votes (40 per cent) was the DC. 
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convention though,  is that  the  King  invites  the  person  who  will  have  the  prospect  
of  establishing  a  stable  government.93 
The  second  type of  government  that can  result  from  the  hung  parliament  is  
a  single  party,  minority  government.  This  is  the  arrangement  where  a  party,  
normally  the  one  with  most  seats  in  the  House  of  Commons,  is  supported  by  
other  parties usually  smaller parties through ad hoc  agreements based on  common  
interests.94  These  agreements  will  assist  government  to  survive  a confidence  
testing  parliamentary  process  in exchange  for certain  concessions to  the  other  
parties  in respect of a political  program. However, care must be taken when taking this 
route that government must at all material times enjoy the confidence of the House. 
In 2012,  the DC intimated its  eagerness  to  try this  avenue95 when  the  party  
realized  that  the  provisional  coalition  of  the ABC, LCD and  BNP had  taken  the  
majority of  the  members  of  the  National  Assembly.96  However, the plan could not 
materialize. The constitutional challenge with this route that the DC wanted to take was 
that the other three political parties had already crunched a provisional agreement 
which prima facie managed to constitute the majority of the House. In that event, there 
is no way the DC would have been allowed to form a government when there was a 
majority in Parliament already. This second type works best when there is no other 
possible political agreement which is able to constitute the majority of the House. 
In both types of negotiation, the process entirely depends on political dynamics.  
In  2010  in  Britain  the  political negotiation  was  technically supported  by  the  civil  
servants.97 In  Lesotho  the  process  was wholly  private and political parties  secured  
their  own  technical teams to  negotiate and  write  up any coalition  agreement.  So,  the  
process  of  negotiating a  government out  of  a  hung  parliament is  more  of a  political 
problem, than  a  constitutional  one.98  As   one  British  authority contends, a “hung  
parliament or  even  a  succession  of hung parliaments  need  not  lead  to  a 
constitutional crisis”.99 
5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It  would  seem  that  the  fundamental principle  that the government must  at all 
material times enjoy  the  confidence of  the  National  Assembly is  applicable in Lesotho  
to  both  clear majority situations and  situations of  hung parliament. This convention is 
the bedrock of section 87 of the Constitution of Lesotho. Another important  convention  
is  that a government  does  not  resign  until  someone  who  can  command  the  
majority  of the  National  Assembly  has  been  secured.  It is  the  King’s  prerogative,  
                                                 
93 Generally see Blackburn R “Monarchy and the Personal Prerogatives” (2004) Public Law 546; See also 
Brazier (2005). 
94 See The Cabinet Manual (2011) 14-15. 
95 “What is a constitutional minority government?” Sunday Express  2 June 2012.  
96 The three parties had 61 of the 120 members of parliament.  
97 Maer (2010). 
98 Bogdanor (2008). 
99 Bogdanor (2008). 
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which  under  the  new  Constitution of  Lesotho  is  exercised   with the  advice  of  the  
Council  of  State,  to appoint  the  Prime  Minister. The  Constitution  states  clearly  that  
the   electorate  does  not  elect  the  Prime  Minister. While  this  may  be  clearer  under  
the  circumstances  of  a clear  majority,  it  may  be  tricky  in  the  hung  parliament  
situation. So  it  is  prudent  for  the  King  not  to  be  involved  at  early  stage  during  
political  negotiations. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  it  is  apparent  from  the  forgoing  discussion  that  some  
reforms should be  introduced to  the  process  of  formation  of  a government in 
Lesotho. Leaving  it to  broad British conventions creates a  lot  of  uncertainty not  only  
for  the  appointing  authority,  the  monarch,   but even  the  electorate. It  always  works  
best  for  the  political system  when  the  electorate  knows  with  certainty  the  final 
outcome  of the voting process.  To  that  end,  certain recommendations can  be  made  
regarding  the  development  of  the  system. First, it  may  be  important to clearly  
demarcate the  caretaker period  in  Lesotho, and  the restrictions placed  on  the 
government  during  this  time. What  is  clear  in  terms  of  the  constitution  is  that  
three  months  after dissolution of Parliament, there  should  be  an election,100  and  that 
14 days  after the  announcement of  the election results  Parliament must  convene.101  
As  regards  the  timeline  for  the formation  of  a government  and  the  restrictions on  
government during this  time  the  Constitution  is  silent. 
Secondly, proper codification of these conventions may be necessary. Lesotho  
has  a  written  constitution so  the  first  and  supreme  point  of  reference  for the  
principles  of  government  is  the  Constitution  itself.  So,  reliance  on  unwritten 
constitutional conventions  may  lead  to  unnecessary conflict between  political  
players.  Thirdly, it is recommended that the Constitution should introduce an 
investiture vote for the Prime Minister. Leaving the determination of who shall become 
the Prime Minister to obscure political process creates unnecessary uncertainty that has 
potential to degenerate into conflict. An investiture vote is the process by which 
parliament after election sits to elect the Prime Minister.102 In this way Parliament is 
some sort of Electoral College to elect the Prime Minister on behalf of the electorate.103 
The vote should really be symbolic, just for purposes of certainty both for the electorate 
and the appointing authority.  In the case of an inconclusive election, post-election 
coalition negotiations should precede the vote. Investiture vote will not only eliminate 
uncertainty in the process of formation of government but will also make the electorate 
indirectly elect the Prime Minister. 
                                                 
100 Section 84(1) of the Constitution of Lesotho 1993. 
101 Section 82 (1) (b) of the Constitution of Lesotho 1993. 
102Bergman T “Constitutional design and government formation: the expected consequences of negative 
parliamentarism” (1993) 16(4)   Scandinavian Political Studies 282. 
103 There is a view held by some members of the public to the effect that the Prime Minister must be 
elected directly by the electorate. See Development for Peace Education. Report on Community Voices on 
New Zealand Report (2014). The argument that the electorate must move closer to the election of Prime 
Minister has merit. However, the direct election of the Prime Minister will affect the fabric of the design as 
a parliamentary model. There are advantages in allowing the parliamentary nature of the system to 
evolve and develop incrementally.  Even semi-parliamentary systems like South Africa and Botswana still 
retain the parliament as the epicenter of the political system. 
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Other quasi-parliamentary systems, like Botswana and South Africa, have the 
investiture vote. In Botswana, the President is elected by the National Assembly; the 
President is not directly elected by the electorate.104 The Constitution of South Africa 
provides that at its first sitting after its election, ‘and whenever necessary to fill a 
vacancy, the National Assembly must elect a woman or a man from amongst its 





                                                 
104 See section 32 of the Constitution of Botswana 1966. For an analysis of the constitutional and political 
design in Botswana see Good K “Authoritarian liberalism: a defining characteristic of Botswana” (1996) 
14(1) Journal of Contemporary African Studies  29. 
105 See s 86 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
